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1896 notice-actually represented the same water right. The Court stated that
another reasonable interpretation of the survey was that the two water rights
were distinct. The Court held that the Ranch failed to prove error on the part
of the water court.
Accordingly, the Court affirmed the water court's denial of the Ranch's
motion to amend its water right.
GabielKester

NEW MEXICO
Bounds v. New Mexico ex rel. D'Antonio, Nos. 32,713 32,717, 306 P.3d
457 (N.M. 2013) (holding (i) New Mexico Domestic Well Statute ("DWS")
requiring state engineer to issue domestic well permits without regard to the
availability of unappropriated water did not violate prior appropriation pnnciples as enshrined in the New Mexico Constitution; and (ii) the plaintiffs failed
to demonstrate how the DWS deprived holders of a property interest in senior appropriative rights).
Horace Bounds ("Bounds"), a farmer and rancher in the Mimbres basin
in southwestern New Mexico, brought a facial constitutional challenge- against
New Mexico's DWS, which requires the state engineer to issue domestic well
permits without also determining the availability of unappropriated water. On
June 15, 2006, Bounds filed an action for declaratory judgment in New Mexico's Sixth Judicial District Court ("district court"), arguing three counts in his
complaint. The first count asked the district court to rule the DWS unconstitutional as it requires the state engineer to issue domestic well permits without
determining the availability of unappropriated water. Bounds argued this permitting system operated to the detriment of senior water holders and in violation of New Mexico's prior appropriation standard. The second count asked
for a ruling that the issuance of domestic well permits, in accordance with the
DWS, constituted a taking under the United States and New Mexico Constitutions. Lastly, Bounds asked for an injunction preventing the state engineer
from issuing new domestic well permits without also determining if unappropriated water was available. The New Mexico Farm and Livestock Bureau
("NMFLB"), an independent and nongovernmental agency representing many
farm and ranch families, filed a motion to intervene, which the district court
granted. The state engineer then filed a motion for summary judgment arguing
the language of the DWS evidenced clear legislative intent that domestic well
permits were outside the scope of the general prior appropriation system.
The district court: (i) ruled the DWS unconstitutional as a matter of law as
it concluded the DWS was an impermissible exception to the prior appropriation standard; and (ii) rejected Bounds's takings claim because he was unable
to show any injury to his existing senior water rights as a result of the DWS.
The state engineer appealed the district court's constitutional holding to the
Court of Appeals, which reversed the district court's holding. The Court of
Appeals reasoned that the prior appropriation doctrine contained in Article
XVI of the New Mexico Constitution sets forth only general and broad prmiciples, while the New Mexico legislature had authority to enact a specific statuto-
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ry system for administrating for water appropriation. Therefore, the legislature's exception to the existing priority administration system was not a per se
violation of the priority doctrine. Bounds and NMFLB ("Petitioners") then
each filed petitions of certiorari to the Supreme Court of New Mexico
("Court") to review the Court of Appeals' constitutional holding.
The Court addressed two of the Petitioners' challenges: (i) the DWS required the state engineer to issue domestic well permits without acknowledging
whether unappropriated water was available, thereby violating New Mexico's
Constitutional prior appropriation doctrine; and (ii) the failure to provide notice prior to the state engineer's issuance of those domestic well permits violated the Petitioners' due process rights.
First, the Court considered Petitioners' facial constitutional challenge de
novo. Although Petitioners failed to establish that the DWS creates specific
risk of impairment to water rights holders- a necessary element to sustain a
facial constitutional challenge- the Court exercised its discretion and decided
nevertheless to rule on the merits of the case. Article XVI, Section 2 of the
New Mexico Constitution states, "[Piriority of appropriation shall give the
better right." With the language of the DWS in mind, the Court held that the
language "better right" merely provides guidance when two existing water rights
are in conflict. The Court noted that the DWS was just a permitting statute; it
was silent on how the state engineer was to administer domestic well permits.
Nothing in the DWS prevented the state engineer from administering domestic well permits in a priority system, as the New Mexico Constitution requires.
Mistakenly, Petitioners equated the issuance of a permit under the DWS with
an absolute right to acquire and utilize that water pursuant to the issued permits. However, contrary to the Petitioners' contentions, the DWS did not
grant applicants an absolute right. Like all water rights, any drilling rights
granted by the DWS were ultimately conditioned on the availability of water.
Therefore; because the DWS dealt with permitting and not administration, it
did not facially violate the New Mexico Constitition's prior appropriation
standards.
Next, the Court addressed the Court of Appeals' ruling that the prior appropriation doctrine set forth broad principles and nothing else. The Court
specifically rejected this ruling and stated that such an interpretation could lead
to an improper level of legislative and administrative discretion over priority
water rights.
Last, the Court considered whether the DWS violated the Petitioners'
procedural and substantive due process rights. In order for the Court to declare a violation of due process, the Petitioners must show an actual and personal deprivation or injury. However, as the district court held, Petitioners,
specifically Bounds, were unable to show DWS caused any injury to their water rights. The Court rejected Bounds's claim that any new appropriations in a
closed and fully appropriated basin would necessarily cause Bounds injury.
Although Bounds produced an expert witness, that expert failed to show the
effect of the domestic wells on Bounds' water rights. Thus, the Court rejected
the due process challenge, concluding that any alleged injury was only speculative.
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Accordingly, the Court affirmed the Court of Appeals's decision that the
DWS did not violate the United States Constitution and the New Mexico
Constitution, and that the DWS did not violate Petitioners' due process rights.
Devon Bell

NORTH DAKOTA
Maddock v. Andersen, 830 N.W.2d 627 (N.D. 2013) (holding that the
district court did not err in denying injunctive relief to appellants in challenge
to stop water flow onto their land from a drainage ditch on appellees' adjacent
property by holding (i) appellees demonstrated a reasonable necessity and use
for the drainage ditch; (ii) appellees could not reasonably avoid injury to appellants' property; (iii) the appellees' benefit of homestead protection outweighed
the injury to appellants' crops; (iv) "Act of God" designation properly described
increased rainfall, and; (v) appellants failed to mitigate the water flow's damage).
Appellants Francis and Deborah Maddock ("the Maddocks") appealed the
District Court, Dickey County, Southeast Judicial District's denial of permanent injunctive relief in the Maddocks' suit against Larry and Jane Andersen
("the Andersens") to stop water flow onto the Maddocks' farmland from a
drainage ditch on the Andersens' property. The Maddocks alleged the Andersens' drainage ditch, which in the past properly drained water into a slough on
the Andersens' farm, now unreasonably drained and pooled water onto the
Maddocks' land and caused injury to a portion of their crops. Expert witnesses
from both parties testified at trial about water flow from the drainage ditch,
slough, and other areas. The district court concluded the Maddocks failed to
prove the drainage ditch contributed primarily to the pooled water on their
land. The district court also concluded the Andersens satisfied the reasonable
use doctrine as applied to surface water drainage by showing they needed the
open drainage ditch to protect their homestead, and they took reasonable care
to prevent unnecessary injury to the Maddocks' property.
The Maddocks appealed the district court's ruling to the Supreme Court
of North Dakota ("court"), arguing that the district court erred in (i) finding the
Andersens complied with the reasonable drainage use rule and (ii) denying the
Maddocks' prayer for injunctive relief.
The court defined the surface water drainage reasonable use doctrine: a
landowner, acting in good faith and with a legitimate purpose, could drain
surface waters from his land to another's land. The court further stated that
surface water drainage satisfies the reasonable use doctrine if: (i) there is reasonable necessity for such drainage; (ii) the draining land's owner takes reasonable care to prevent unnecessary injury to the receiving land; (iii) the benefit to
the drained land outweighs the receiving land's injury; and (iv) the draining
land's owner reasonably improves the natural drainage system, where practicable, or adopts an artificial drainage system.
The Maddocks first argued that the district court should order the drainage ditch's closure because the Andersens did not show a reasonable necessity

